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BRADY, TRUST, AND ERROR 
Samuel R. Wiseman∗ 
INTRODUCTION 
The Supreme Court’s retreat1 over the last thirty-plus years 
from the expansive Fourth Amendment and robust exclusionary 
rule of Katz2 and Mapp3 – the backwards march accompanied by 
the steady drumbeat of the threat of unsolved crimes and 
unpunished criminals4 – provides the narrative structure to 
criminal procedure classes everywhere.  More recently and less 
obviously, the scope and enforcement of the Brady v. Maryland5 
 
∗ Assistant Professor, Florida State University College of Law (J.D., Yale Law 
School; B.A., Yale University).  Tamara Piety and Lyn Entzeroth offered thoughtful 
feedback, and Cabell Fassnacht provided excellent research assistance.  I am grateful 
to Imre Szalai and the Loyola University New Orleans College of Law Journal of 
Public Interest Law for inviting me to participate in this symposium on Connick v. 
Thompson and prosecutorial immunity. 
 1.  See, e.g., Herring v. United States, 555 U.S. 135, 147-48 (2009) (refusing to 
exclude evidence when police negligently collected evidence under a warrant that 
had been recalled and affirming the “good faith” rule); id. at 141 (finding that “the 
benefits of deterrence must outweigh the costs” for the exclusionary rule to apply); 
Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 819 (1996) (allowing pretextual stops by 
police); Dow Chem. Co. v. United States, 476 U.S. 227, 238-39 (1986) (holding that 
aerial surveillance of a facility did not require a search warrant); United States v. 
Knotts, 460 U.S. 276,287 (1983) (holding that monitoring of beeper signals did not 
require a search warrant); Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 745-46 (1979) (holding 
that “the installation and use of a pen register” did not require a search warrant); 
Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 134 (1978) (denying Fourth Amendment standing 
when incriminating evidence is found in a search “of a third person’s premises”); 
Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 494 (1976) (denying federal habeas corpus relief for a 
Fourth Amendment claim “where the State has provided an opportunity for full and 
fair litigation” of the claim); United States v. Pineda-Moreno (Pineda-Moreno I), 591 
F.3d 1212, 1216-17 (9th Cir.), reh’g en banc denied, 617 F.3d 1120 (9th Cir. 2010) 
(relying on Knotts in holding that monitoring a car with GPS does not require a 
search warrant).  But see United States v. Maynard, 615 F.3d 544, 557 (D.C. Cir. 
2010), cert. granted sub nom United States v. Jones, 131 S. Ct. 3064 (2011)  (holding 
that GPS monitoring requires a search warrant). 
 2.  Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967). 
 3.  Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961). 
 4.  See, e.g., Herring, 555 U.S. at 147 (“repeated holdings that the deterrent effect 
of suppression must be substantial and outweigh any harm to the justice system”). 
 5. 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963) (holding that “the suppression by the prosecution of 
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disclosure rule has been similarly curtailed.  Connick v. 
Thompson,6 limiting municipal liability for Brady violations 
under § 1983,7 is the latest example. In the last ten years the 
Court has also called into serious doubt the application of Brady 
to the plea bargaining process8 and repeatedly adopted restrictive 
interpretations of the statute governing federal habeas for state 
prisoners,9 an important avenue for establishing Brady 
violations.  This trend is more difficult to explain, at least at first 
glance. 
The Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule comes at an 
obvious cost to the criminal justice system’s ability to convict the 
guilty, although the exact price is hotly contested.10  More 
broadly, the Fourth Amendment itself involves an implicit 
 
evidence favorable to an accused upon request violates due process where the 
evidence is material either to guilt or to punishment, irrespective of the good faith or 
bad faith of the prosecution”). 
 6.  131 S. Ct. 1350, 1356 (2011). 
 7.  28 U.S.C. § 1983 (2006). 
 8.  United States v. Ruiz, 536 U.S. 622, 633 (2001) (holding that the government 
need not disclose impeachment evidence prior to a guilty plea); Ruiz, 536 U.S. at 633-
34 (Thomas, J., concurring) (arguing that Brady does not apply at all prior to plea 
bargains).  See also Samuel Wiseman, Waiving Innocence, 96 MINN. L. REV.  
(forthcoming 2012) (describing how some circuits have followed Justice Thomas’s 
view), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/cf_dev/ AbsByAuth.cfm?per_id=160 
6911.   
 9.  See, e.g., Cullen v. Pinholster, 131 S. Ct. 1388, 1398 (2011), for federal habeas 
cases, limiting review under § 2254(d) to “the record that was before the state court 
that adjudicated the claim on the merits;” Harrington v. Richter, 131 S. Ct. 770, 784-
85 (2011) (presuming that a claim has been adjudicated on the merits  “[w]hen a 
federal claim has been presented to a state court and the state court has denied 
relief,” and thus requiring federal habeas court deference under the Antiterrorism 
and Effective Death Penalty Act).   
 10.  See, e.g., Tracey Maclin, When the Cure for the Fourth Amendment Is Worse 
than the Disease, 68 S. CAL. L. REV. 1, 43 (1994) (concluding that “the exclusionary 
rule has not been responsible for the release of dangerous criminals who prey on 
society”); Dallin Oaks, Studying the Exclusionary Rule in Search and Seizure, 37 U. 
CHI. L. REV. 665 (1970) (concluding that improper search and seizure “frequently 
results in the immediate termination of the prosecution” in an empirical study that 
focuses primarily on deterrence). A limited effect is reported in Peter F. Nardulli, The 
Societal Costs of the Exclusionary Rule: An Empirical Assessment, 8 AM. B. FOUND. 
RES. J. 585 (1983) (showing a success rate of suppression in only approximately 0.6 
percent of the fewer than five percent of cases in which motions to suppress were 
filed); U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, NAT’L INST. OF JUSTICE, THE EFFECTS OF THE 
EXCLUSIONARY RULE: A STUDY IN CALIFORNIA 2 (1982) (showing a failure to 
prosecute approximately one-third of drug cases in Los Angeles County as a result of 
improper searches).  See also Samuel Estreicher & Daniel P. Weick, Opting for a 
Legislative Alternative to the Fourth Amendment Exclusionary Rule, 78 UMKC L. 
REV. 949, n.8 (citing to and describing some of these sources). 
WISEMAN.FORMATTED (DO NOT DELETE) 5/16/2012  1:39 PM 
2012] Brady, Trust, and Error 449 
tradeoff: more privacy for less security.11  If there are a few more 
government agents looking through our phone records or 
arresting us on expired warrants, there are fewer unbroken crime 
rings and criminals going free on technicalities.  Or at least that’s 
the idea.  In the Brady context, on the other hand, the tradeoffs 
are less obvious.  As announced by the Court in 1985, exculpatory 
evidence is “material” under Brady “only if there is a reasonable 
probability that, had the evidence been disclosed to the defense, 
the result of the proceeding would have been different.”12  Under 
this formulation, and in stark contrast to the Fourth Amendment, 
there is little chance of a windfall for the truly deserving of 
conviction – only those who may well have been acquitted had all 
the available evidence been presented can get relief.  What, then, 
is motivating the Court’s erosion of the Brady right and its 
remedies?  And can it be justified?  After identifying the trend in 
Part I, this essay will suggest some possible answers in Part II. 
I.  NARROWING BRADY, DIRECTLY AND INDIRECTLY 
A.  REDUCING COMPLIANCE: CONNICK V. THOMPSON  
AND VAN DE KAMP V. GOLDSTEIN 
At trial, prosecutors of the Orleans Parish District Attorney’s 
office failed to turn over the blood evidence that would ultimately 
prove defendant John Thompson’s innocence.13  Another 
prosecutor failed again nine years later after receiving the 
deathbed confession of a conscience-stricken colleague.14  As a 
result of these failures, Mr. Thompson spent eighteen years in 
prison and came within weeks of execution before a private 
investigator finally uncovered the crucial evidence.15  The facts of 
Connick v. Thompson are as gripping as its outcome – no relief – 
is galling.  In reaching this result, the Court severely limited 
municipalities’ liability under § 1983 for failing to train their 
prosecutors to comply with Brady.  This will presumably, in the 
natural course of events, reduce training and, ultimately, 
 
 11.  Cf. Alexander A. Reinert, Public Interest(s) and Fourth Amendment 
Enforcement, U. ILL. L. REV. 1461, 1464 (2010) (observing that “the Court views (and 
has viewed for the past several decades) Fourth Amendment disputes as a tension-
filled clash between public interests, such as law enforcement, and individual 
interests, such as privacy and autonomy” but disputing the validity of this view).   
 12.  United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 682 (1985).  
 13.  Connick v. Thompson  131 S. Ct. 1350, 1356 (2011). 
 14.  Id. at 1356, n.1.  
 15.  Id. at 1357. 
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The Court has long held that § 1983 does not impose 
respondeat superior liability on municipalities; their liability 
must stem from their own “acts.”17  For the purposes of § 1983, 
local governments act by setting official policy.  “Official policy” 
can be formal, e.g., a city ordinance or a rule in a police 
department handbook, or informal, e.g., customs or practices not 
written down (and perhaps not even spoken about) but “so 
persistent and widespread as to practically have the force of 
law.”18  In Connick, the jury had rejected the claim that the 
relevant Brady violation was the result of a policy, formal or 
informal, against complying with Brady.19  Instead, it found 
liability based on what the Supreme Court has referred to as a 
policy of “failure to train.”20  To establish this type of liability, a 
plaintiff must show that the local government’s failure to provide 
training “evidences a ‘deliberate indifference’ to the rights of its 
inhabitants.”21  Deliberate indifference must generally be shown 
by establishing a pattern of constitutional violations that the 
existing training regime has failed to prevent.22  Thompson, 
however, did not argue that he had established such a pattern.  
Instead, he relied on an exception to the pattern requirement, 
discussed in two Supreme Court cases, in situations where the 
potential for constitutional violations in the absence of training is 
sufficiently obvious.23  Although the Court has never actually 
affirmed liability on this theory, Canton v. Harris did provide a 
 
 16.  See Susan A. Bandes, The Lone Miscreant, The Self-Training Prosecutor, and 
Other Fictions: A Comment on Connick v. Thompson, 80 FORDHAM  L. REV. 715, 727-
28 (2012) [hereinafter Bandes, The Lone Miscreant] (explaining that prosecutorial 
misconduct is a “leading cause of wrongful convictions,” emphasizing the “need for 
training” to prevent misconduct, and observing that Connick “rejected the need for 
prosecutorial training”).   
 17.  Pembaur v. Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469, 479 (1986). 
 18.  Connick, 131 S. Ct. at 1359. 
 19.  See Respondent’s Brief on the Merits at 7, Connick v. Thompson, 131 S. Ct. 
1350 (2011) (No. 09-571) 2010 WL 3167311 at *1. 
 20.  Bd. of Cnty Comm’rs v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 410 (1997). 
 21.  City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 389 (1989). 
 22.  Brown, 520 U.S. at 407 (“If a program does not prevent constitutional 
violations, municipal decision makers may eventually be put on notice that a new 
program is called for. Their continued adherence to an approach that they know or 
should know has failed to prevent tortious conduct by employees may establish the 
conscious disregard for the consequences of their action – the ‘deliberate indifference’ 
– necessary to trigger municipal liability.”).  
 23.  Id. at 398; Canton, 489 U.S. at 390. 
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hypothetical example: arming police officers without providing 
training on the use of deadly force.24  Thus, Thompson argued, 
the risk of Brady violations resulting from failure to provide 
relevant training to young prosecutors was so obvious as to allow 
a finding of deliberate indifference to the rights of the defendants 
prosecuted.  Going further, Thompson argued that he had 
demonstrated that Connick, the policymaker for Orleans Parish, 
was personally deliberately indifferent to the risk of Brady 
violations as illustrated by his failure to provide training despite, 
inter alia, his own ignorance of Brady’s requirements, his 
awareness that his young prosecutors needed training to comply 
with Brady’s “elastic” demands, his lack of interest in ensuring 
that his prosecutors did not commit violations, and the fact that 
as of the time of Thompson’s conviction, courts had already found 
four Brady violations committed by his office.25 
The Court, split five-to-four, rejected both theories. In 
concluding that the risk of untrained prosecutors committing 
Brady violations was not sufficiently obvious, the court pointed to 
the grounding in legal reasoning and research that lawyers 
receive in law school,26 the “threshold requirement” of the bar 
exam, the existence of continuing-education obligations, and the 
opportunity for “on-the-job” training.27  As for Thompson’s 
argument that Connick was personally and deliberately 
indifferent, the Court disposed of it in a footnote, fixating on 
Thompson’s use of the phrase “culture of indifference,” and 
 
 24.  Canton, 489 U.S. at 390 n.10 (citing Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1 (1985)). 
 25.  See Respondent’s Brief on the Merits at 8-12, 37-41 Connick v. Thompson,  
131 S. Ct. 1350 (2011) (No. 09-571); see also Jennifer E. Laurin, Prosecutorial 
Exceptionalism, Remedial Skepticism, and the Legacy of Connick v. Thompson, UNIV. 
OF TEX. SCH. OF LAW (Public Law and Legal Theory Research Paper Series No. 202, 
2011), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1934250 (describing Thompson’s 
arguments). 
 26.  If Connick is indeed one of the “meanest” decisions in the Court’s history, see  
Bandes, The Lone Miscreant, supra note 16, at 716 (quoting Dahlia Lithwick, Cruel 
but Not Unusual, SLATE, Apr. 1, 2011, http://www.slate.com/id/2290036/), it does 
have at least have one heartening aspect: at a time when the value of the current 
system of legal education is being widely questioned, a majority of the Supreme 
Court has given it a ringing endorsement.  See, e.g., Clifford Winston, Op-Ed: Are 
Law Schools and Bar Exams Necessary?, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 24, 2011, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/10/25/opinion/are-law-schools-and-bar-exams-
necessary.html?_r=2; Paul Campos, Welcome to my Nightmare, INSIDE THE LAW 
SCHOOL SCAM BLOG, (Aug. 7, 2011, 6:40 AM), http://insidethelawschool 
scam.blogspot.com/2011_08_01_archive.html (arguing that “law professors are 
scamming their students”). 
 27.  Connick, 131 S. Ct. at 1361-64. 
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concluding that this “culture” could not be evidence of Connick’s 
subjective awareness, but was, rather, “essentially an assertion 
that Connick’s office had an unconstitutional policy or custom,” a 
claim rejected by the jury.28 
The Court did not limit itself to rejecting the arguments that 
Thompson actually made, however.  Although it recognized that 
Thompson did “not contend” that he had established the requisite 
municipal indifference to warrant the need for training through a 
pattern of Brady violations, the Court nonetheless reached out to 
observe that the four Brady violations predating Thompson’s 
1985 trial could not have supplied the necessary notice that 
training was needed because they did not involve “failure to 
disclose blood evidence, a crime lab report, or physical or 
scientific evidence of any kind,” and so were “not similar to the 
violation at issue here.”29  The Court explained the need for this 
extraordinary level of specificity by the fact that Orleans Parish 
prosecutors were familiar with the “general Brady rule,” and so 
did not have “the utter lack of an ability to cope with 
constitutional situations that underlies the Canton [arming 
untrained police officers] hypothetical.”30 
Thus, Connick radically restricts municipal liability for 
Brady violations resulting from a municipality’s failure to train 
its prosecutors.31  It will be the rare case indeed in which a 
plaintiff is able to produce a pattern of factually similar, judicially 
identified Brady violations.32  While plaintiffs may still establish 
liability through the existence of an official but informal policy 
(i.e., a custom or practice) of violating Brady, they will likely be 
hampered, as Thompson seems to have been, by the existence of a 
 
 28.  Id. at 1364 n.10. 
 29.  Id. at 1360 n.7. 
 30.  Id. at 1363.  In the Canton hypothetical, the Court cited Tennessee v. Garner, 
which held that the use of deadly force to stop an unarmed suspected burglar from 
escaping over a fence was an unreasonable seizure under the Fourth Amendment.  
Canton, 489 U.S. at 390 n.10 (citing Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1 (1985)).  It is 
beyond the scope of this essay to determine whether the men and women of law 
enforcement should take umbrage at the Court’s belief that recent law school 
graduates are better equipped to decide questions with which even “judges struggle,” 
424 U.S. 409, 425 (1976), than police officers are to realize that it isn’t reasonable to 
shoot a non-dangerous suspect in the back as he’s trying to escape. 
 31.  See Bandes, The Lone Miscreant, supra note 16, at 718 (suggesting that 
Connick limits municipal failure to train liability “perhaps to the vanishing point”). 
 32.  See id. at 723 (“Demanding judicial reversals sets a bar that is not only 
unprecedented but onerously high in Brady cases.”). 
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formal policy mandating compliance.  Two years earlier, the 
Court eliminated supervisory prosecutors’ individual liability for 
failures to train or supervise their subordinate attorneys.33 
Since Imbler v. Pachtman in 1976, prosecutors have enjoyed 
absolute immunity from § 1983 claims arising from actions 
“intimately associated with the judicial phase of the criminal 
process.”34  Imbler left open, however, the question of whether 
this immunity extends to prosecutors’ administrative functions.35 
Thomas Goldstein, who had served twenty-four years in prison on 
the basis of a conviction obtained in a trial in which the 
prosecution failed to disclose impeachment material as required 
by Giglio,36 sought to exploit this narrow opening.  He brought 
suit not against the attorneys who had prosecuted him, but 
against their chief supervisory attorneys, alleging that, inter alia, 
they failed to provide adequate training and oversight to their 
juniors.37  The Court unanimously extended Imbler immunity, 
holding that the same concerns underlying the decision in that 
case – fear that the threat of suit could affect prosecutors’ trial-
related decisions, the danger of liability for honest mistakes, and 
the possibility of litigation years after the alleged violation – all 
required absolute individual immunity for failures to train or 
supervise.38 
The result of Connick and Van de Kamp is likely to be less 
Brady training for prosecutors, although how much less is, of 
course, difficult to predict.  Fear of § 1983 liability is (or was) not 
the only thing motivating governments and supervisory 
prosecutors to provide guidance and supervision to their 
employees regarding their Brady obligations, of course.  Ethical 
prosecutors and municipalities will see it as a duty.  Less 
idealistically, policymakers and supervisors could fear that 
reversed convictions due to Brady violations by untrained junior 
prosecutors would lead to adverse political consequences.39  On 
 
 33.  Van de Kamp v. Goldstein, 555 U.S. 335 (2009). 
 34.  Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 430 (1976). 
 35.  Id. at 431 n.33. 
 36.  Van de Kamp, 555 U.S. at 339-40 (citing to Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 
150 (1972). 
 37.  Id. at 340. 
 38.  Van de Kamp, 555 U.S. at 346-48. 
 39.  This was obviously not a concern for Harry Connick, Sr.  And justifiably so, 
considering that he served for thirty years despite the numerous Brady violations 
committed by his office.  See Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 455 (1995) (Stevens, J., 
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the other end of the spectrum, they could worry that junior 
prosecutors with only a general knowledge might disclose more 
than necessary out of fear of committing a violation.  Indeed, both 
overdisclosure and underdisclosure (perhaps even in the same 
case) are likely results of untrained lawyers dealing with complex 
questions.40  Nonetheless, as economists and, increasingly, legal 
scholars, never get tired of pointing out, people respond to 
incentives,41 and the incentives for providing that training have 
decreased: local governments won’t face § 1983 liability for failing 
to provide it unless things are totally out of hand, and individual 
supervisors won’t be liable even if they are totally out of hand.  At 
the same time, the costs in supervisor time and energy of 
providing that training have remained constant.  Even worse, 
governments have an incentive to keep their formal policies as 
broad and uninformative as possible – “comply with the 
Constitution” – in order to avoid potential liability from a 
document more detailed but correspondingly fraught with risk of 
error. 
In sum, then, after Connick and Van de Kamp there will very 
likely be less Brady training and consequently more Brady 
violations.  This will only compound the larger, widely known 
problem of the lack of an effective enforcement mechanism for 
Brady.42  Brady violations are difficult to discover – the only one 
with proof of the violation is often the violator.  As a result, many 
are never revealed.43  Indeed, the Court’s recent decisions 
restrictively interpreting the statute governing federal habeas for 
state prisoners are likely to make Brady violations even less 
 
concurring) (noting that the case, prosecuted by Connick’s office, involved “many 
instances of the state’s failure to disclose exculpatory evidence”). 
 40.  Or maybe not – after all, lawyers have gone to law school and passed the bar 
exam – and then there’s CLE.  See Connick, 131 S. Ct. at 1361-62.   
 41.  See Erwin Chemerinsky, The Role of Prosecutors in Dealing with Police 
Abuse: The Lessons of Los Angeles, 8 VA. J. SOC. POL’Y & L. 305, 320 (2001) 
(concluding that “[i]ncentives matter”); Tracey L. Meares, Rewards for Good 
Behavior: Influencing Prosecutorial Discretion and Conduct with Financial 
Incentives, 64 FORDHAM L. REV. 851, 855 (1995) (observing “that people generally 
will perform better if they are given incentives to perform at a higher level”); see also 
Alafair S. Burke, Talking About Prosecutors, 31 CARDOZO L. REV. 2119, n.21 (2010) 
(describing incentives and citing to these and other sources).  
 42.  See, e.g., Richard A. Rosen, Disciplinary Sanctions Against Prosecutors for 
Brady Violations: A Paper Tiger, 65 N.C. L. REV. 693, 731-32 (1987) (explaining how 
prosecutorial discretion, immunity, and strict materiality standards in post-
conviction review limit the consequences of Brady violations for prosecutors).   
 43.  See, e.g., Burke, supra note 41, at 2128-29. 
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likely to come to light.44  A large penalty would then seem to be 
required to offset the low risk of detection, but it does not 
presently exist.  As discussed above, Imbler provides absolute 
individual liability, and, as richly illustrated by Connick itself, 
the threat of meaningful professional sanction or criminal 
prosecution45 is more illusory than real.  A grand jury 
investigation into the prosecutors who withheld the lab report 
was canceled after one day,46 and the disciplinary action against 
Michael Riehlmann, the attorney who received his colleague’s 
deathbed confession and failed to report it, resulted in only a 
public reprimand.47 Brady violations do lead to vacated 
convictions, of course, but the defendants may still be retried – 
putting the violating prosecutor roughly where he would have 
been if he had disclosed in the first place. There remains the 
stigma that accompanies a judicial determination that a 
prosecutor has violated the Constitution, but even here the Court 
has weakened the disincentive, noting that even “honest 
prosecutors” can violate Brady.48  Maybe so.  After Connick and 
Van de Kamp, they will do so more frequently. 
B.  MOVING TOWARD LIMITING BRADY  
TO TRIAL: UNITED STATES V. RUIZ 
In an equally troubling development, the Court has recently 
called into significant question the application of Brady to the 
plea bargaining process.49  Roughly nineteen out of twenty 
 
 44.  See, e.g., Cullen v. Pinholster, 131 S. Ct. 1388, 1398 (2011); Harrington v. 
Richter, 131 S. Ct. 770, 784-85 (2011); see also Samuel Wiseman, Habeas After 
Pinholster, 53 B.C. L. REV. (forthcoming 2012) (describing Cullen v. Pinholster and 
its likely effects).  
 45.  See Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 428-29 (1976): 
We emphasize that the immunity of prosecutors from liability in suits under § 1983 
does not leave the public powerless to deter misconduct or to punish that which 
occurs. This Court has never suggested that the policy considerations which compel 
civil immunity for certain governmental officials also place them beyond the reach of 
the criminal law. Even judges, cloaked with absolute civil immunity for centuries, 
could be punished criminally for willful deprivations of constitutional rights on the 
strength of 18 U.S.C. § 242, the criminal analog of § 1983. The prosecutor would fare 
no better for his willful acts.  Moreover, a prosecutor stands perhaps unique, among 
officials whose acts could deprive persons of constitutional rights, in his amenability 
to professional discipline by an association of his peers (internal citations omitted).   
 46.  Connick, 131 S. Ct. at 1375 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
 47.  In re Riehlmann, 891 So.2d 1239 (La. 2005). 
 48.  Van de Kamp, 555 U.S. at 342 (quoting Imbler, 424 U.S. at 425). See also 
Connick, 131 S. Ct. at 1367 (Scalia, J., concurring) (“Brady mistakes are inevitable.”). 
 49.  See generally Wiseman, supra note 8. This development is troubling, in part, 
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convictions are obtained by guilty plea.50  Despite the enormous 
barriers to overturning a conviction after such a plea, twenty-
three51 of the 275 convictions so far overturned as a result of DNA 
evidence52 were the result of guilty pleas. Although the merits of 
plea bargaining are beyond the scope of this essay, it is enough to 
say that innocent defendants sometimes conclude that it is in 
their best interest to plead guilty for a variety of reasons, 
including their assessment of the likelihood of conviction based on 
the known evidence.53 A pre-trial Brady right can help 
defendants make a more accurate assessment, and thus reduce 
the number of wrongful convictions.  Indeed, innocent defendants 
are often at a particular informational disadvantage, because 
they may know nothing about the crime.54 
And indeed, prior to 2002 many courts had recognized a 
Brady right in the pretrial period,55 holding, for example, that  
Brady material was “pertinent not only to an accused’s 
preparation for trial but also to his determination of whether or 
 
because “nondisclosure pre-plea” may be common.  Janet Hoeffel, Prosecutorial 
Discretion and the Core: The Good Prosecutor Meets Brady, 109 PENN ST. L. REV. 
1133, 1148 (2005) (citing to Ruiz).   
 50.  Douglas A. Berman, Should Juries Be the Guide for Adventures Through 
Apprendi-Land, 109 COLUM. L. REV. SIDEBAR 65, 67 n.12 (2009) (citing Tracey 
Kyckelhahn & Thomas H. Cohen, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE 
STATISTICS BULLETIN: FELONY DEFENDANTS IN LARGE URBAN COUNTIES, 2004, at 1 
(2008), available at  http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/pdf/fdluc04.pdf (finding that, 
in the nation’s 75 most populous counties, more than 95% of convictions occurred 
through guilty plea); U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, 2008 SOURCEBOOK OF FEDERAL 
SENTENCING STATISTICS Figure C (2009), available at  http://www.ussc.gov/Data_and 
_Statistics/Annual_Reports_and_Sourcebooks/2008/FigC.pdf  (reporting that 96.3% of 
all federal convictions in fiscal year 2008 were the result of guilty pleas). 
 51.  See When the Innocent Plead Guilty, INNOCENCE PROJECT, http:// 
www.innocenceproject.org/Content/When_the_Innocent_Plead_Guilty.php; see also 
Wiseman, supra note 8  (manuscript at 10-11).  
 52.  See INNOCENCE PROJECT, FACTS ON POST-CONVICTION DNA EXONERATIONS, 
http://www.innocenceproject.org/Content/Facts_on_PostConviction_DNA_Exoneratio
ns.php; see also Wiseman, supra note 8 (manuscript at 56) 
 53.  See, e.g., Wiseman, supra note 8 (manuscript at 56) (citing to the extensive 
literature on innocent defendants pleading guilty and their reasons for doing so).   
 54.  See Wiseman, supra note 8 (manuscript at 10 n.42) (citing Erica Hashimoto, 
Toward Ethical Plea Bargaining, 30 CARDOZO L. REV. 949, 951 (2008)). 
 55.  See Kevin C. McMunigal, Guilty Pleas, Brady Disclosure, and Wrongful 
Convictions, 57 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 651, 653 (2007) (identifying three circuits, one 
federal district court, and appellate courts in eight states that found a “due process 
duty to disclose Brady material prior to the entry of a guilty plea”) (cited in 
Wiseman, supra note 8 (manuscript at 37)). 
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not to plead guilty.”56 Only the Fifth Circuit and several lower 
courts declined to recognize a pretrial right to Brady material.57 
In 2002, the Supreme Court issued United States v. Ruiz, 
casting significant doubt on the existence of such a right.58  Ruiz 
involved a challenge to a plea agreement which required the 
defendant to waive her right to receive impeachment information 
relating to the government’s witnesses and to receive information 
supporting any affirmative defenses she might have, but which 
explicitly recognized a continuing government duty to turn over 
evidence “establishing the factual innocence of the defendant.”59  
Ruiz refused to sign the waiver, and ultimately pleaded guilty 
and received a harsher punishment than she would have received 
had she signed the waiver and accepted the government’s offer.60  
The Ninth Circuit recognized a right to Brady material before 
signing a plea agreement, and held that this right could not be 
waived.61  In an opinion joined by eight justices, the Court held 
that “the Constitution does not require the Government to 
disclose material impeachment evidence,” or any information 
regarding any affirmative defense, “prior to entering a plea 
agreement with a criminal defendant.”62  In reaching this 
conclusion, the Court observed that “impeachment information is 
special in relation to the fairness of a trial, not in respect to 
whether a plea is voluntary,”63 and found no relevant distinction 
between the right to impeachment information and the many 
rights that can be waived without an ex ante determination of 
their value.64  Finally, performing a due process balancing test, 
 
 56.  United States v. Avellino, 136 F.3d 249, 255 (2d. Cir. 1988) (cited in Wiseman, 
supra note 8 (manuscript at 49)). 
 57.  McMunigal, supra note 55, at 653-54; Matthew v. Johnson, 201 F.3d 353 (5th 
Cir. 2000). 
 58.  United States v. Ruiz, 536 U.S. 622 (2001). 
 59.  Id. at 625. 
 60.  Id. at 625-26. 
 61.  United States v. Ruiz, 241 F.3d 1157, 1167 (9th Cir. 2001).  
 62.  Ruiz, 536 U.S. at 633. 
 63.  Id. at 629. 
 64.  Id. at 629-30 (“[T]he law ordinarily considers a waiver knowing, intelligent, 
and sufficiently aware if the defendant fully understands the nature of the right and 
how it would likely apply in general in the circumstances – even though the 
defendant may not know the specific detailed consequences of invoking it. A 
defendant, for example, may waive his right to remain silent, his  right to a jury 
trial, or his right to counsel even if the defendant does not know the specific 
questions the authorities intend to ask, who will likely serve on the jury, or the 
particular lawyer the State might otherwise provide.”); see also id. at 630 (“It is 
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the Court concluded that the burden on the government in the 
form of exposed informants and the disruption of ongoing 
investigations outweighed the “limited” value of the right in 
question.65  The Court treated the affirmative defense portion of 
the waiver summarily, noting that most of the same reasoning 
applied, and that “in the context of this agreement, the need for 
this information is more closely related to the fairness of a trial 
than to the voluntariness of the plea,” and “the value in terms of 
the defendant’s added awareness of relevant circumstances is 
ordinarily limited,” and outweighed by the costs to the 
government.66 Justice Thomas concurred, stating briefly that 
Brady does not apply pretrial.67 
The full import of Ruiz is not clear, and the courts of appeals 
have split as to whether it forecloses the existence of a right to 
material exculpatory evidence prior to entering into a plea 
agreement.68 As the Second Circuit has observed, both the basic 
 
difficult to distinguish, in terms of importance, (1) a defendant’s ignorance of grounds 
for impeachment of potential witnesses at a possible future trial from (2) the varying 
forms of ignorance at issue in these cases.”); id. at 630-31 (“This Court has found that 
the Constitution, in respect to a defendant’s awareness of relevant circumstances, 
does not require complete knowledge of the relevant circumstances, but permits a 
court to accept a guilty plea, with its accompanying waiver of various constitutional 
rights, despite various forms of misapprehension under which a defendant might 
labor. See Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 757 (1970) (defendant 
‘misapprehended the quality of the State’s case’)”); id. (defendant misapprehended 
“the likely penalties”); id. (defendant failed to “anticipate a change in the law 
regarding” relevant “punishments”); McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 770 
(1970) (counsel “misjudged the admissibility” of a “confession”); United States v. 
Broce, 488 U.S. 563, 573 (1989) (counsel failed to point out a potential defense); 
Tollett v. Henderson, 411 U.S. 258, 267 (1973) (counsel failed to find a potential 
constitutional infirmity in grand jury proceedings).  
 65.  Ruiz, 536 U.S. at 631-32. 
 66.  Id. at 632. 
 67.  Id. at 633-34 (Thomas, J., concurring).  
68. Cf. Friedman v. Rehal, 618 F.3d 142, 154 (2d Cir. 2010) (“[T]he Supreme Court 
has consistently treated exculpatory and impeachment evidence in the same way for 
the purpose of defining the obligation of a prosecutor to provide Brady material prior 
to trial. . .”); and United States v. Conroy, 567 F.3d 174, 179 (5th Cir. 2009) 
(concluding that Ruiz “never makes such a distinction” between types of pretrial 
evidence and that a distinction between impeachment and exculpatory evidence 
cannot be “implied from its discussion”); and United States v. Moussaoui, 591 F.3d 
263, 286 (4th Cir. 2010) (citing Jones v. Cooper, 311 F.3d 306, 315 n. 5 (4th Cir. 2002) 
(noting that a prosecutor’s withholding “potentially relevant as mitigation evidence” 
prior to a plea does not merit invalidation of a guilty plea), with McCann v. 
Mangialardi, 337 F.3d 782, 787 (7th Cir. 2003) (observing that “Ruiz strongly 
suggests that Brady-type disclosure might be required under the circumstances” 
because exculpatory evidence is “entirely different. . . Ruiz indicates a significant 
WISEMAN.FORMATTED (DO NOT DELETE) 5/16/2012  1:39 PM 
2012] Brady, Trust, and Error 459 
Brady right and its extension to impeachment information are 
centered on the likelihood of a finding of guilt if the concealed 
evidence had been considered.69  From this perspective, it is 
difficult to distinguish between evidence that an alleged 
eyewitness has a strong incentive to lie and evidence, say, that 
another witness’s testimony can provide the defendant with an 
alibi.  On the other hand, when determining that the value of the 
pretrial Giglio right was limited, the Ruiz Court expressly noted 
that the existence of the government’s promise to provide 
evidence of factual innocence “diminishes the force of [the] 
concern that, in the absence of impeachment information, 
innocent individuals, accused of crimes, will plead guilty.”70 
The Court will ultimately have to resolve this question.  If it 
reverses its recent trend and recognizes a right to Brady material 
before entering into a plea agreement, the administrative 
burdens on prosecutors will increase, perhaps significantly, given 
the staggering number of plea bargains – or perhaps not so 
significantly, if the right is defined narrowly.71  If it does not, an 
 
distinction between impeachment information and exculpatory evidence of actual 
innocence” and that “it is highly likely that the Supreme Court would find a violation 
of the Due Process Clause if prosecutors or other relevant government actors have 
actual knowledge of a criminal defendant’s factual innocence but fail to disclose such 
information to a defendant before he enters into a guilty plea.”). See also In re 
Miranda, 182 P.3d 513, 542-43 (Cal. 2008) (“Ruiz by its terms applies only to 
material impeachment evidence, and the high court emphasized that the government 
there had agreed to ‘provide any information establishing the factual innocence of 
the defendant’ regardless.’”); Ollins v. O’Brien, No. 03C579503C7175, 2005 WL 
730987, at *11 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 28, 2005) (holding that “due process requires the 
disclosure of information of factual innocence during the plea bargaining process”).  
The Tenth Circuit, in an unpublished decision, looked to McCann and agreed with its 
reasoning. In United States v. Ohiri, the court concluded that “the Supreme Court [in 
Ruiz] did not imply that the government may avoid the consequence of a Brady 
violation if the defendant accepts an eleventh-hour plea agreement while ignorant of 
withheld exculpatory evidence in the government’s possession.” United States v. 
Ohiri, 133 Fed. App’x. 555, 562 (10th Cir. 2005).  The court explained that two 
elements make the facts in Ruiz substantially different from other plea cases, 
including the fact that the plea in Ruiz was a pre-indictment federal plea (under the 
fast-track program) selection and that it involved impeachment evidence. These 
contrasted with Ohiri’s “eleventh-hour plea” on the day of jury selection and the 
prosecution’s withholding of exculpatory evidence.  See generally Wiseman, supra 
note 8 (manuscript at 39). 
 69.  See Friedman, 618 F.3d at 154 (2d Cir. 2010); see also United States v. 
Conroy, 567 F.3d 174, 178 (5th Cir. 2009). 
 70.  Ruiz, 536 U.S. at 631. 
 71.  If the right included only convincing evidence of “factual innocence,” for 
example, one would hope that few prosecutors in possession of such evidence would 
pursue a guilty plea.  Some courts have recognized a general due process right to 
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uncertain number of innocent defendants will likely plead guilty 
when they otherwise would not have.72 
II.  BRADY AS A SKEPTIC’S RULE IN A TRUSTING ERA 
If, then, the Court has recently been restricting both the 
scope of the Brady rule and the remedies for violations, what has 
been motivating the rollback?  As touched on above, in the Court’s 
long and ongoing campaign to limit the reach of the Fourth 
Amendment and weaken or abolish the exclusionary rule, the 
rationale is clear and easy to understand.  The Fourth 
Amendment limits what law enforcement can do to prevent and 
investigate crime, including very serious crimes like terrorist 
attacks.  In return, of course, we get greater freedom from official 
observation and intrusion, and a bulwark against arbitrary and 
authoritarian government.  The Court has clearly felt on 
numerous occasions that, on balance, we are better off with 
greater security despite the cost to the interests protected by the 
Fourth Amendment.73  We may or may not agree with the values 
the Court has placed on these interests, but the formula itself is 
reasonable and probably unavoidable.  The case against the 
Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule is even more 
straightforward: the Fourth Amendment must have a meaningful 
remedy, but few of us are happy to let the truly guilty go free.74 
 
withdraw a guilty plea in the face of “outrageous” government behavior, such as the 
suppression of highly exculpatory evidence.  See Wiseman, supra note 8 (manuscript 
at 47)  (citing Ferrera v. United States, 456 F.3d 278, 291 (1st Cir. 2006)); Matthew 
v. Johnson, 201 F.3d 353, 364 n.15 (5th Cir. 2000) (stating that “[e]ven if the 
nondisclosure is not a Brady violation,” failure to disclose evidence pretrial may 
sometimes make it “impossible for [a defendant] to enter a knowing and intelligent 
plea”). 
 72.  But see John C. Douglass, Fatal Attraction? The Uneasy Courtship of Brady 
and Plea Bargaining, 50 EMORY L.J. 437, 445 (2001) (arguing that Brady provides 
little benefit to defendants in the plea bargaining process). 
 73.  See Herring v. United States, 555 U.S. 135, 147 (2009). 
 74.  See, e.g., Akhil Reed Amar, Fourth Amendment First Principles, 107 HARV. L. 
REV. 757, 792-93 (1994) (arguing that “the courts best affirm their integrity and 
fairness not by closing their eyes to truthful evidence [under the exclusionary rule], 
but by opening their doors to any civil suit brought against wayward government 
officials, even one brought by a convict” and that society “cherishes the notion that 
cheaters – or murderers, or rapists, for that matter – should not prosper”); Reinert, 
supra note 11, at 1465 (“The source of the ambivalence towards the exclusionary 
remedy is the perception, affirmed just last Term, that whenever invoked, the rule 
imposes a substantial cost on society in the form of permitting a guilty defendant to 
go free.”); Herring, 555 U.S. at 141 (“The principal cost of applying the rule is, of 
course, letting guilty and possibly dangerous defendants go free – something that 
‘offends basic concepts of the criminal justice system.’” (quoting United States v. 
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This desire to make sure the guilty are punished partially 
explains a previous generation of Brady-narrowing.  Brady tells 
us “that the suppression by the prosecution of evidence favorable 
to an accused upon request violates due process where the 
evidence is material either to guilt or to punishment,” but it does 
not explain what is “material.”75  It has been suggested by 
scholars and judges that Justice Douglas used the word to mean, 
essentially, “relevant.”76  Whatever the merits of such a rule, it 
would seem to demand that courts grant new trials on the basis 
of suppressed evidence when, due to the weight of the 
incriminating evidence, the suppressed, favorable evidence would 
have had little chance of leading to an acquittal.  Because some of 
the beneficiaries of these windfalls could not be effectively retried 
due to fading memories and missing or dead witnesses, some 
truly guilty defendants would go free.  Some wrongful convictions 
would also be prevented or overturned, of course, but the Court 
was ultimately not willing to accept this tradeoff. 
In Agurs, the Court held that the Brady rule applied 
regardless of whether the evidence was requested by the defense, 
but that in such cases “[t]he proper standard of materiality must 
reflect our overriding concern with the justice of the finding of 
guilt. . . .  If there is no reasonable doubt about guilt whether or 
not the additional evidence is considered, there is no justification 
for a new trial.”77  In Bagley, the Court applied this reasoning to 
all cases except those involving the prosecution’s use of perjured 
testimony, regardless of whether a request was made, holding 
 
Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 908 (1984)); Pa. Bd. of Prob. & Parole v. Scott, 524 U.S. 357, 364 
(1998) (describing “the rule’s ‘costly toll’ upon truth-seeking and law enforcement 
objectives”); Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 490 (1976) (concluding that application of 
the exclusionary rule “often frees the guilty” and may generate “disrespect for the 
law and administration of justice”).  Cf.  Christopher Slobogin, Why Liberals Should 
Chuck the Exclusionary Rule, U. ILL. L. REV. 363, 383 (1999 ) (arguing that allowing 
setting guilty defendants free under the Fourth Amendment – often justified by 
liberals in light of the deterrence enabled by the exclusionary rule – will not deter 
future police violations). 
 75.  Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963). 
 76.  See, e.g., Scott Sundby, Fallen Superheroes and Constitutional Mirages: The 
Tale of Brady v. Maryland, 33 MCGEORGE L. REV. 643, 646-47 (2002) (citing United 
States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 703 n.5 (1985) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (arguing that 
there is “strong evidence that Brady might have used the word [material] in its 
evidentiary sense, to mean, essentially, germane to the points at issue.”); Strickler v. 
Greene, 527 U.S. 263, 298 (1999) (Souter, J., dissenting) (“Brady itself did not 
explain what it meant by ‘material’ (perhaps assuming the term would be given its 
usual meaning in the law of evidence False”)). 
 77.  United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 112-13 (1976). 
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that “evidence is material only if there is a reasonable probability 
that, had the evidence been disclosed to the defense, the result of 
the proceeding would have been different. A ‘reasonable 
probability’ is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in 
the outcome.”78  As the Court further explained in Kyles, Brady is 
violated when the undisclosed evidence “could reasonably be 
taken to put the whole case in such a different light as to 
undermine confidence in the verdict.”79 
The result of this line of cases was to drastically reduce the 
chance that truly guilty defendants will benefit from Brady.  If 
this is so, and the modern Brady rule does little more than 
protect (a lucky few of) the innocent, then the Court’s desire to 
ensure the punishment of wrongdoers cannot account for its 
recent limitations on the right and its remedies.  The remainder 
of this essay will suggest a possible explanation. 
A.  THE COURT’S RENEWED FAITH 
Part of the answer to the Court’s uneasy relationship with 
Brady surely lies in the complexity and uncertainty of the 
obligation placed on prosecutors.  As Kyles80 makes clear, the 
prosecutor’s duty to disclose can only be finally determined on the 
basis of the whole record – that is, after trial, when the violation 
(if any) has necessarily already occurred.81  As a result, the Court 
is clearly concerned about the possibility of punishing (if that’s 
the right word) even “honest prosecutor[s],”82 a danger 
heightened by the fact that the court has applied Brady to 
“evidence known only to police investigators and not to the 
prosecutor.”83  Similarly, the Court is plainly concerned that a 
 
 78.  Bagley, 473 U.S. at 682. See Sundby, supra note 76, at n.35 and 
accompanying text. 
 79.  Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 434 (1995).  
 80.  Id. at 434. 
 81.  See Alafair S. Burke, Improving Prosecutorial Decision Making: Some Lessons 
of Cognitive Science, 47 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1587, 1610 (2006) (“Because Brady’s 
materiality standard turns on a comparison of the supposedly exculpatory evidence 
and the rest of the trial record, applying the standard prior to trial requires that 
prosecutors engage in a bizarre kind of anticipatory hindsight review,” requiring 
them to “anticipate what the other evidence against the defendant will be by the end 
of the trial, and then speculate in hypothetical hindsight whether the evidence at 
issue would place ‘the whole case’ in a different light.” (footnotes omitted)). 
 82.  Van de Kamp v. Goldstein, 555 U.S. 335, 342 (2009) (quoting Imbler v. 
Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 425 (1976)). 
 83.  Kyles, 514 U.S. at 438. 
WISEMAN.FORMATTED (DO NOT DELETE) 5/16/2012  1:39 PM 
2012] Brady, Trust, and Error 463 
broad and vigorously enforced Brady rule would be inconsistent 
with the American system of competitive justice, causing 
prosecutors to “shade [their] decisions”84 towards disclosure and 
risking “displace[ment of] the adversary system as the primary 
means by which truth is uncovered.”85 
These explanations, however, do not tell the entire story.  
They represent only one side of the equation – the costs, or 
perceived costs, of the Brady rule, which, presumably, have 
remained fairly constant over the last ten years.  The moving 
force behind the Court’s recent ambivalence towards Brady likely 
lies on the other side, in the Court’s perception of Brady’s 
benefits. 
In a world in which prosecutors can be trusted not to 
prosecute when they have serious doubts about the guilt of the 
defendant, or at the very least to make sure the jury hears all the 
evidence, the need for Brady isn’t especially pressing – mistakes 
will happen, but they will be rare, and can to some degree be 
ameliorated by rules allowing for the presentation of new 
evidence after conviction.86  When Brady was issued in 1963, this 
was not the world of the American criminal justice system.  In a 
sad history that scarcely needs to be recounted here, entrenched 
institutional and societal racism, combined with a dearth of 
meaningful procedural protections for the poor and unconnected, 
led to injustice on a massive scale, and the Warren Court’s 
attempt to combat these problems through constitutional 
criminal procedure is another narrative arc familiar to law 
students everywhere.87 Brady, of course, is a Warren Court 
decision, and a product of that era: if state prosecutors could not 
be trusted not to convict the innocent by suppressing evidence, a 
federal remedy was necessary.  Similar motivations underlay the 
Court’s resurrection of § 198388 and its expansive approach to 
 
 84.  Van de Kamp, 555 U.S. at 341 (quoting Imbler, 424 U.S. at 423). 
 85.  United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 675 (1985).  
 86.  Cf. Alafair Burke, Revisiting Prosecutorial Disclosure, 84 IND. L.J. 481, 488 
(2009) (“If a conscientious prosecutor faces exculpatory evidence that would shake 
her faith in any conviction she might obtain without the evidence, then she will 
presumably dismiss charges against the defendant. This would render disclosure of 
the evidence, and Brady itself, irrelevant.”). 
 87.  David Alan Sklansky, Police and Democracy, 103 MICH. L. REV. 1699, 1805 
(2005) (observing that “criminal procedure in the Warren Court era was famously 
preoccupied with issues of illegitimate inequality, particularly those associated with 
race.”). 
 88.  See Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961). 
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federal habeas,89 necessary enforcement mechanisms for Brady, 
and other constitutional rights. 
As the worst abuses of the past were curtailed (and the 
justices of the Warren Court were replaced), the Court’s perceived 
need for skepticism of the conduct and motivations of police and 
prosecutors (and government generally) declined.90  But in 1976 
the Court still felt compelled, when granting prosecutors absolute 
immunity from § 1983 liability, to reassure us that it did not 
“leave the public powerless to deter misconduct or to punish that 
which occurs,” and that “18 U.S.C. § 242, the criminal analog of  § 
1983,” remained available.91  And Justice White, speaking for two 
other justices, could argue that absolute immunity should not 
extend to Brady claims because “it is reasonable to suspect that 
most such violations never surface. . . . [making it] all the more 
important, then, to deter such violations by permitting damage 
actions under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 to be maintained in instances 
where violations do surface.”92 
Similarly, even while dissenting from the Court’s decision 
allowing municipal liability in  Pembaur v. Cincinnati in 1986, 
Justice Powell could affirm, joined by Chief Justice Burger and 
soon-to-be-Chief Justice Rehnquist, that “[t]he primary reason for 
imposing § 1983 liability on local government units is deterrence, 
so that if there is any doubt about the constitutionality of their 
actions, officials will ‘err on the side of protecting citizens’ 
rights,’”93 and that “law enforcement officials, as much as any 
other official, ‘ought to err on the side of protecting citizens’ 
rights’ when they have legitimate doubts about the 
constitutionality of their actions.”94 Turning to federal habeas, as 
late as 1989 Justice O’Connor could command the votes of the 
Court’s conservative wing to agree with the second Justice 
 
 89.  See, e.g., Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293, 322 (1963) (requiring a federal 
habeas hearing).   
 90.  Cf. Anthony O’Rourke, The Political Economy of Criminal Procedure 
Litigation, 45 GA. L. REV. 721, 750-65 (2011) (describing the “post-Warren Court shift 
toward a conservative criminal procedure doctrine” but arguing that this shift 
resulted partially from a decline in the participation of “impact litigation 
organizations” in Court litigation and not necessarily from improved conditions).  See 
also id. at n.5 (collecting other accounts of the post-Warren criminal procedure shift).   
 91.  Imbler v. Pachtman 424 U.S. 409, 428-29 (1976). 
 92.  Id. at 443-44 (White, J., concurring). 
 93.  Pembaur v. Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469, 495 (1986) (Powell, J., dissenting) 
(quoting Owen v. City of Independence, 445 U.S. 622, 652 (1980)). 
 94.  Id. 
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Harlan that “[t]he threat of habeas serves as a necessary 
additional incentive for trial and appellate courts throughout the 
land to conduct their proceedings in a manner consistent with 
established constitutional standards.”95 
If the Court’s level of skepticism had been on a long decline, 
recently it seems to have fallen off a cliff.  Pointedly, Justice 
Thomas’s opinion in Connick does not address the need for 
deterrence.  In Harrington v. Richter, Justice Kennedy, writing 
for a unanimous court, disavowed the very idea that state courts 
might tailor their behavior in response to the possibility of federal 
habeas review: “There is no merit to the assertion that 
compliance with § 2254(d) should be excused when state courts 
issue summary rulings because applying § 2254(d) in those cases 
will encourage state courts to withhold explanations for their 
decisions.  Opinion-writing practices in state courts are 
influenced by considerations other than avoiding scrutiny by 
collateral attack in federal court.”96  Perhaps the most revealing 
quote comes from the also-unanimous Van de Kamp: “[M]embers 
of a large prosecutorial office, when making prosecutorial 
decisions, could have in mind the consequences in terms of 
damages liability [when] they are making general decisions about 
supervising or training . . . .  Moreover, . . . better training or 
supervision might prevent most, if not all, prosecutorial errors at 
trial . . . .”97  As of 2009, the Court gives so little consideration to 
the need for deterrence that this can be part of an argument 
against liability. 
B.  THE CASE FOR SKEPTICISM 
If the Court’s retreat from Brady is indeed the result of a 
renewed trust in the fairness and integrity of the nation’s police 
and prosecutors, it is, by its own logic, surely understandable, if 
not ultimately defensible.  Although there is considerable 
disagreement over the extent of our progress, few would argue 
that we have come a long way from the days of Powell v. 
Alabama, at least with respect to the most obvious abuses.98  And 
if prosecutors are generally less inclined to commit “miscarriages 
of justice,” there is less need for a rule explicitly adopted to 
 
 95.  Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 306 (1989) (plurality opinion) (quoting Desist v. 
United States, 394 U.S. 244, 262-63 (1969) (Harlan, J., dissenting). 
 96.  Harrington v. Richter, 131 S. Ct. 770, 784 (2011) 
 97.  Van de Kamp v. Goldstein, 555 U.S. 335, 347 (2009). 
 98.  Powell v. State of Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932). 
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prevent them.99  But even if every governmental actor were to act 
in perfect good faith, a robust – and robustly-enforced – Brady 
rule would still be needed, as there remains a compelling reason 
to be skeptical of prosecutorial decision making.  Modern mind 
sciences, backed by investigation into confirmed wrongful 
convictions, have compellingly demonstrated the ways in which 
cognitive biases can lead even the most honest and fair-minded 
prosecutors to discount exculpatory evidence when deciding to 
prosecute (and to continue prosecuting).  As Alafair Burke has 
neatly explained: 
As an initial matter, the prosecutor’s case screening for guilt 
may not be especially protective of the defendant. Because of 
confirmation bias, prosecutors “testing” a hypothesis of the 
defendant’s guilt may be likely to search the case evidence for 
proof confirming that hypothesis to the detriment of exculpatory 
evidence. Once the prosecutor forms a personal belief in guilt, 
that belief becomes “sticky” as selective information processing, 
belief perseverance, and cognitive consistency will prevent the 
prosecutor from revisiting her conclusion. Tunnel vision also 
impairs the prosecutor’s ability to identify material, exculpatory 
evidence to which the defense is entitled under Brady v. 
Maryland, as selective information processing will cause the 
prosecutor to overestimate the strength of her case without the 
evidence at issue and to underestimate the evidence’s potential 
exculpatory value. Finally, the prosecutor’s role as a first and 
constant case screener may lead to cascading effects on other 
prosecutors, judges, and jurors, who might be less scrutinizing for 
reasonable doubt because of an assumption that charges are 
pursued only against the guilty.100 
 
 99.  United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 675 (1985). 
 100.  Bandes, The Lone Miscreant, supra note 16, at 731 (describing prosecutorial 
tunnel vision and “other cognitive biases”); Alafair S. Burke, Neuroscience, Cognitive 
Psychology, and the Criminal Justice System: Prosecutorial Agnosticism, 8 OHIO ST. 
J. CRIM. L. 79 (2010).  See also Susan Bandes, Loyalty to One’s Convictions: The 
Prosecutor and Tunnel Vision, 49 HOW. L.J. 475, 479, 491-92 (2006) (identifying the 
“recurring theme” of “the prosecutor’s tendency to develop a fierce loyalty to a 
particular version of events” with respect to a suspect’s guilt and explaining that one 
contributing factor to this tunnel vision is that “[p]rosecutors may begin with an 
assumption that the suspect would not have been arrested unless he was guilty, and 
that assumption will affect the way they filter and assess all subsequent 
information”); Alafair S. Burke, Improving Prosecutorial Decision Making: Some 
Lessons of Cognitive Science, 47 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1587, 1610, 1614, 1618 (2006) 
(proposing “cognitive psychology as providing a potential basis for explaining the 
mechanism underlying the prosecutor’s bias” in judging whether to disclose Brady 
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evidence and evaluating the value of the evidence itself, including “[c]onfirmation 
bias, selective information processing, and belief perseverance,” and observing that 
“some social science evidence suggests that self-awareness is not enough to prevent 
cognitive bias” (citing P. C. WASON & P. N. JOHNSON-LAIRD, PSYCHOLOGY OF 
REASONING: STRUCTURE AND CONTENT 194-97 (1972)); Lee Ross et al., Perseverance 
in Self-Perception and Social Perception: Biased Attributional Processes in the 
Debriefing Paradigm, 32 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 880, 880-88 (1975)); id. at 
1603 (“The phenomenon of confirmation bias suggests a natural tendency to review 
the reports not for exculpatory evidence that might disconfirm the tested hypothesis, 
but instead for inculpatory, confirming evidence.”); Alafair S. Burke, Prosecutorial 
Passion, Cognitive Bias, and Plea Bargaining, 91 MARQ. L. REV. 183, 196, 198 (2007) 
(concluding that as a result of selective information processing, in which “people 
readily accept evidence that is consistent with their current beliefs and find reasons 
to distrust or dismiss contradictory evidence,” “[i]f the file [of the accused] does 
contain any exculpatory or mitigating information, the prosecutor will devalue it as a 
result of her pre-existing beliefs”); Keith A. Findley & Michael S. Scott, The Multiple 
Dimensions of Tunnel Vision in Criminal Cases, WIS. L. REV. 291, 327 (2006) 
(explaining that for police detectives, “deciding where and what type of evidence to 
look for is significantly influenced by the theory of how the crime unfolded,” and that 
“[i]mportant physical evidence, either confirmatory or exculpatory, might . . . be 
overlooked if the theory of the case prevailing at the time of evidence collection later 
proves wrong”); id. at 331 (observing that “role pressures naturally incline 
prosecutors to investigate in ways that confirm guilt, to fail to recognize and hence 
fail to disclose to the defense exculpatory evidence”); Jonathan A. Fugelsang & Kevin 
N. Dunbar, A Cognitive Neuroscience Framework for Understanding Causal 
Reasoning and the Law, 359 PHIL. TRANSACTIONS ROYAL SOC’Y LONDON B 1749, 
1749-54 (2004) (explaining that “evidence inconsistent with one’s beliefs is more 
likely to invoke neural tissue associated with error detection and conflict monitoring” 
(cited in Bandes, Loyalty, at 492)); Peter A. Joy, The Relationship Between 
Prosecutorial Misconduct and Wrongful Convictions: Shaping Remedies for a Broken 
System, WIS. L. REV. 399, 427 (2006 ) (noting “the suppression of material evidence” 
as the “leading cause” of wrongful convictions, observing that prosecutors are rarely 
held accountable for their errors, and that this causes further prosecutorial bias 
(citing Jim Dwyer, Peter Neufeld & Barry Scheck, Actual Innocence app. at 265 
(2000)); Dianne L. Martin, Lessons About Justice from the “Laboratory” of Wrongful 
Convictions: Tunnel Vision, the Construction of Guilt, and Informer Evidence, 70 
UMKC L. REV. 847, 848 (2002) (“Investigators focus on a suspect, select and filter the 
evidence that will ‘build a case’ for conviction, while ignoring or suppressing evidence 
that points away from guilt.”); Barbara O’Brien, A Recipe for Bias: An Empirical 
Look at the Interplay Between Institutional Incentives and Bounded Rationality in 
Prosecutorial Decision Making, 74 MO. L. REV. 999, 1036 (2009) (explaining that 
prosecutors could potentially be a check on police detectives, who “may overlook leads 
pointing in other directions and become overly committed to pursuing the wrong 
suspect,” but that prosecutors and police “work together closely,” and police guide 
“how the case is prosecuted”); id. at 1039-40 (arguing that the expectation that the 
prosecutor will objectively weigh the need to disclose Brady evidence is “unrealistic” 
and that “if prosecutors can convince themselves that the rule does not even apply, 
they need not be concerned with the remote possibility that the defense will discover 
the failure to disclose”); Ellen Yaroshefsky, Cooperation with Federal Prosecutors: 
Experiences of Truth Telling and Embellishment, 68 FORDHAM L. REV. 917, 961-62 
(1999) (quoting prosecutors, in explaining their interviews with cooperators, as 
admitting that “[y]ou do not want a complete set of materials that you have to 
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Thus, a strong Brady rule is necessary not only to deter the 
Gerry Deegans of the world who would consciously suppress 
exculpatory evidence, but to help overcome the unconscious 
biases of even the most scrupulous prosecutor.  From this 
perspective, it is desirable that local governments and chief 
prosecutors should “take account”101 of the risk of liability in 
order to nudge them to “err on the side of protecting citizens’ 
rights”102 when they would otherwise honestly, but incorrectly, 
decide that a given piece of evidence need not be disclosed.  Brady 
is a skeptic’s doctrine.  It remains necessary because we should 
doubt not the average prosecutor’s desire to “see that justice is 
done”103 in every case, but his ability to do so. 
CONCLUSION 
As Mr. Thompson’s sad ordeal demonstrates, the threat of 
wrongful conviction – whether obtained at trial or through a plea 
agreement – remains, despite the enormous legal and societal 
progress of the last half-century.  Brady, despite its many 
flaws,104 remains an important tool for the prevention of wrongful 
convictions, but one that the Court has recently weakened in both 
scope and remedy.  Implicit in these decisions is the notion that 
the need for the Brady rule has greatly diminished.  The Court’s 
renewed faith in the motives and workings of the justice system is 
understandable; its failure to acknowledge and respond to 
overwhelming evidence of its flaws is deeply unfortunate. 
 
 
 
disclose” and that “there are cases where the assistant forbade the agent from taking 
notes. It’s prevalent in big cases. The extent of de facto Brady issues is significant 
because most oral statements do not get turned over.”); id. at 945 (quoting a 
prosecutor as admitting that “many people do not want to uncover facts that are 
inconsistent with their theory of the case”).  
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